by David Gonzalez
As the flow of Unita’s forces to assembly points throughout the country runs down to a trickle, the crucial question is whether the Angolan peace process will reach the point of no return?
This question looms permanently over peoples’ heads in Luanda, as they go about their daily business facing the hardships brought about by war. The government has been taking emergency measures to ease the plight of common Angolans’ — but inflation continues to run at over 3000 percent, while the value of the national currency, the recently introduced Readjusted Kwanzas, slips on a day-to-day basis.
After the 1992 elections in Angola. Unita plunged Angola back into war precisely because it had not demobilized before the polls. Although more recently its leader, Dr. Jonas Savimbi, for the first time publicly apologized for having rejected the election results and re-igniting war, promising never to go back to the bush, most people in Angola and abroad have learned the lesson that peace will not be guaranteed while two separate armies exist in the country.
According to a timetable to implement the agreements reached in Lusaka more than a year ago, the turning point should have been reached in the last quarter of 1995. By then, the cantonment of Unita’s troops should have been an irreversible fact, and agreement on the few pending – mainly military – issues should have been reached.
Since late 1995, Unita frequently blamed the UN and the international community for delays in the quartering of its troops.
In September, Savimbi appealed to the international community to support cantonment, or else troops “could pose a serious threat to peace.” Unita’ s Ben-Ben and Isaias Samakuva cautioned that lack of habitable conditions in cantonment areas could force troops to abandon them.
The cantonment process started late and slow, and then came to a complete halt in the last weeks of 1995. Since mid-October, Unita boycotted the meetings of the Joint Commission, claiming that General Ben-Ben, one of its military leaders and chief negotiator, had narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in Luanda In late November, as the government army attacked and occupied some areas that had been under Unita control around the oil-rich region of Soyo (in what they claimed was a retaliation to Unita’ s ceasefire violations and provocations in the region) Unita stopped cantonment altogether.
In Angola, quite frequently, steps towards peace gain momentum after a brief upsurge of military confrontation and this happened again after the renewed fighting of late 1995. By21 December, Unita made new commitments to speed up the implementation of peace, among others, the quick implementation of cantonment, beginning on 15 January.
But, again, Unita raised obstacles, claiming that the government was launching an offensive towards Quibaxe (Uige), an accusation that was quickly proven false. Several observers criticized Unita’s delaying tactics, judged as an instrument to pursue a state of “no war, no peace” to rearm and reorganize its forces.
The “quality” of Unita’s cantonment gave rise cantonment long before the Ben-Ben incident and the alleged government offensive in Uige. In September, Ben-Ben himself had cautioned that not all Unita soldiers arriving at cantonment areas would have weapons with them, admitting that the average age of Unita’s cantoning soldiers was only 18.
As a condition for cantonment, Unita’ s Secretary-General, Paulo Lukamba Gato, requested the return of the government’s Rapid Deployment Police to their barracks and the expulsion of the controversial South African security services company Executive Outcomes from Angola Army representatives in the Joint Commission, however, urged that the Lusaka Protocol did not indicate that the cantonment of Unita forces should be carried out simultaneously with other commitments accepted by the government.
Before halting cantonment, Unita never reached the agreed pace of 150 men cantonment (.per day, and therefore had less than 1 000 men in camps by November. Besides, there were reports that some Unita soldiers were deserting their cantonment areas in preference for government cantonment areas.
Unita claims to have up to 72 000 combatants, although the figure accepted in November 1994 was 63.000. Many independent sources, however, put that figure at half.
Unita should have had 20,000 men in cantonment areas by January 20 1996. The US and other members of the UN Security Council expressed grave concern because the new date of 15 January, accepted by Unita in Bailundo to begin cantonment (already postponed from 20 November), passed by. They insisted that the international community was quickly losing patience, and threatened that UNA VEM’s mandate (costing some US$1 million per day) might not be renewed at a meeting scheduled for 8 February if the cantonment target was not reached by that date.
When he met Madelaine Albright (representing both US President Bill Clinton and the UN Security Council) in Bailundo on 19 January, Savimbi promised to have 16,500 men in cantonment by 8 February. He gave Albright “the word of an oldman, am an old soldier”, am promised to convince his followers. Less than a week later, he told the press that Unita might not only canton 16,500, but rather 20,000 men, if the UN guaranteed the necessary logistics.
Still, by mid-January, Unita’ s cantonment areas in Huarnbo and Uige were empty, a problem that Unita’s commanders in the region blamed on the absence of instructions from the leadership in Bailundo.
Unita’s Brigadier Albano Chassanha for the first time acknowledged that: “There is no doubt that we are behind schedule and, therefore, violating what was agreed” He explained that “we need to deeply work in sensitizing” Unita people, and that is why the organization’s annual conference was convened, to “clarify to leaders and civilian and military cadres about this dynamics.”
As the 8 February deadline approached, many people wondered what would happen when Unita failed to meet the figure. On the eve of the deadline, Unita had cantoned 6856 men and handed in 6805 weapons in four camps. Unita claimed that another 5000 were moving towards the camps, but by 8 February only a total of 8278 had registered.
A few days before, an article in an article Journal de Angola commented that, regardless of the cost, probably the world would be even ready to tolerate a new fiasco in cantonment, in terms of dates, if this can be compensated by a ‘good’ meeting between President Dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi,” in which both leaders would announce “concrete decisions, not to be mistaken by mere declarations of intention,”
Since they signed the Lusaka Agreement in late 1994, both leaders have met in Brussels and Franceville, and with each meeting the peace process had gained renewed momentum. Statements by Unita’s leaders said that the new summit would be a “crucial” one, from which — according to Savimbi — Angolans can expect good news.But the “crucial” meeting has been repeatedly postponed, while Savimbi continues to delay his return to Luanda — and, consequently, the full incorporation of Unita to the government – claiming “security reasons.”
At its meeting of 8 February, in view of Unita’s failures, the Security Council took a middle-of-the-road decision, by renewing UNA VEM’s mandate for only 3 months. Predictably, after the deadline came and went, new problems surfaced.
On 9 February, Khaled Yassir, the UN’s deputy representative to Angola said that the Joint Commission had requested the UN to investigate allegations that Unita was recruiting civilians to present them as cantoning soldiers, Observers were concerned at the “quality” of Unita’s troops reporting to the camps and the insignificant amount of ammunition recovered.
By 15 February, 13 841 soldiers had handed in their weapons at Unita’s operative cantonment areas, But four new cantonment camps opened by the UN at Ngove, Ntuco, Quibala and Andulo remained inoperative, because Unita demanded that the Joint Commission should previously inspect them.
More critically, the flow of new arrivals at the assembly points were ebbing, from 1 000 to 300 per day. By mid- February, less than one-third of Unita’s soldiers had been in cantonment. UNA VEM’s Commander, Major-General Sibanda, commented that he suspected that the short extension of UNA VEM’ s mandate had eased pressure on Unita saying that “before February 8, Unita was under pressure. Maybe now they have breathing space and are … assessing their next course of action.”
Colonel Neto Epolanga. Unita’ s Regional Commander at Luena, said Unita wanted UN guarantees that the FAA would not attack assembly points before sending their troops to the Andula camp, an assurance that was quickly promised by Major-General Sibanda. However, by 20 February Unita still claimed that the fear of attacks kept its men from entering camp.
But the main focus of concern continued to be “quality” of Unita soldiers and weapons moving to assembly points where the former were either too young or too old, and the latter much too old. Besides, not all Unita troops were coming with weapons and, much less, with annunciation to assembly points. General. Sibanda warned that “UNA VEM has taken a very steadfast position on that one. We need individuals coming into the quartering areas to bring weapons.”
The extension of government control to Unita-held areas has not made much progress. Unita continues to ferry supplies from Zaire by charter flights, and to apply its own justice. The organization has been criticized for ill-treating UNA VEM’s “Blue Helmets,” while Foreign NGOs have repeatedly been forced to suspend their work in Unita-controlled regions, where the organization is reluctant to allow Angolan NGOs or workers.
Agreement has been reached to incorporate 26,000 of Unita’s men into a 90 OOO-strongFAA (200 of them in the Air Force and 100 in the Navy). But its negotiators have insisted on integrating all its military officers to the FAA.
A senior Unita spokesperson said: “What we are demanding is that the men who accompanied us for many years have an honourable position, even if this should mean the creation of more ministries, vice-ministries or departments.”
Unita’s demand to include 49 of its generals in the army was considered “absurd” by government spokespersons, since this would mean one general for every 500 Unita soldiers incorporated to the FAA. The head of Unita’s delegation to the military talks, Gral. Domingos Lutoke “Wiyo” said that the government’s offer to accept only six of Unita’s generals was “too small a figure, considering the number of generals that Unita has.”
Regardless of the destruction brought about by war, and of the proliferation of peace-oriented statements, peace in Angola is far from final.
Unita now profits from economic activities in vast regions of Angola, and its leaders seem reluctant to pursue peace initiatives further until negotiations grant them enough guarantees, through political or military power, of a chunk in the economy. Recently, Unita leaders pointed out that the government’s mandate expires soon – perhaps a threat of going back on the recognition of its legitimacy if final peace is not agreed by then.
Unita has been repeatedly been accused of stalling for time – first, for Portuguese elections, now, for US elections and for the government’s normal mandate to expire. Many people have taken advantage war situation through organized crime in urban and rural areas (there are an estimated 700 000 weapons in civilian hands in Luanda alone).
Some make 100 percent profits reselling on the streets basic commodities sold at state-controlled prices in shops. In an interview with Journal de Angola, Diogenes Boavida MPLA Parliamentarian) said that “war in the last analysis. Interests a lot of people. Unfortunately, I have to say that it is of interest to more people than I thought”
Facing the resilience of war in Angola even in the light of firm UN pressures. observers suggest an increased involvement by Angola’ s neighbours in the peace process.
The US Vice-President, AI Gore, recently discussed his country’s initiatives with South African President Mandela, and the latter sent his Foreign Minister. Alfred Nzo, to Luanda, in order to prepare a presidential visit that would demonstrate South Africa’s commitment to the Angola peace process.
More recently. Major-General Sibanda has also called on southern African leaders to talk to both President Dos Santos and Savimbi, “and as a group with one voice tell them in no uncertain terms that peace needs to come to Angola”(SARDC)
